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BONUSES AND BRIBES:
MOOD EFFECTS IN MEMORY
ANN K. BOGGIANO

University of Colorado
PAULA T. HERTEL

Trinity University

Free recall of emotionally positive, neutral. and negative adjectives was used as
an indirect assessment of the effects of reward on expectations about intrinsic
interest. Reward for performing later activities described as interesting (a "bo
nus" orientation) produced recall of a greater number of emotionally positive
adjectives, whereas reward for the same activities described as boring (a "bribe"
orientation) produced recall of a larger number of negative adjectives. A cued
expectancy analysis suggests that reward serves to polarize initial attitude about
forthcoming tasks; these polarized attitudes, like moods, influence the nature of
words retrieved from memory.

Recently, the interplay of social and cognitive psychology has provided
some challenging questions and initial answers about the interaction of af
fective and cognitive states. From one perspective, a number of research
ers have been concerned primarily with the effect of mood on memory
structures and processes (Bower, 1981; !sen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp,
1978; Leight & Ellis, 1981). On the other side of this coin, much research
has been directed at understanding how memory structures and processes
affect social phenomena, such as person perception and attitude change
(Hamilton, 1979). In this paper, we wish to emphasize the reciprocity of
these two approaches to the study of social cognition. By juxtaposing a
memory task and a manipulation of intrinsic interest and extrinsic reward,
our intent was to show mood effects on memory and the dual implications
that these effects might have for cognitive theory and a theory of attitude
polarization.
Attitude polarization has been proposed as an initial step in the cued-
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expectancy analysis of the effect of positive incentives on continued inter
est in activities (Boggiano, 1981)-a phenomenon commonly referred to
as the "overjustification effect" (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Lepper & Greene,
1978; Pittman, Boggiano, & Ruble, 1983). According to cued expectan
cy, reward affects subsequent interest in the following manner. First, re
ward polarizes or strengthens initial expectations about the interest value
of a forthcoming activity. That is, reward anticipated in the context of a
task made to appear highly interesting should be interpreted as a bonus
and should cue even more positive feelings about the activity to be per
formed. Likewise, reward provided in the context of the same task made to
appear uninteresting should be interpreted as a bribe and thus should in
tensify negative feelings about the interest value of the task. Even in very
young children, subsequent interest has been shown to depend on inter
pretation of the meaning of reward (Boggiano, Narackiewicz, Main, &
Bessette, 1983; Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Boggiano, Ruble, & Pittman,
1982; Lepper, Sagotsky, Dafoe, & Greene, 1982; Pittman, Emery, & Bog
giano, 1982). To illustrate this phenomenon, a valued prize provided for
going on a blind date with an attractive partner would be expected to gen
erate positive feelings and might even heighten expectations regarding en
joyment. But the same incentive offered for dating an unattractive other
might have the opposite effect.
The second component of cued expectancy involves contrast effects
produced because of these extreme standards of comparison against which
the actual activity is evaluated. Polarized positive attitudes before task en
gagement ultimately produce dissatisfaction and negative judgments about
the actual activity, due to contrast with the high initial standard. Con
versely, polarized negative attitudes before task engagement ultimately
produce positive judgments about the same activity because of contrast
with initially low standards.
These predictions about the importance of internal states (e.g., feel
ings or initial attitudes) on subsequent attitudes differ markedly from a
self-perception analysis of the effect of reward on later interest. Since a
self-perception analysis argues that final attitudes depend primarily on in
terpretation of behavior and on the context in which the behavior occurs,
direction or strength of initial attitudes (e.g., attitude about the interest
value of the activity) should be irrelevant in determining later attitudes
(Bern & McConnell, 1970; Greene, 1974). From a self-perception perspec
tive, then, reward should decrease interest, regardless of whether the task
is manipulated to be perceived as interesting or boring. Thus, the hypothe
sized effect of strength or extremity of initial attitude in determining later
attitude differs substantially from the self-perception model. Research
testing these different predictions provides support for the cued-expectan
cy model but not for the self-perception model (Boggiano, 1981).
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However, although behavioral evidence has been provided for con
trast as a component of this process, attitude polarization has received
some support only from attitudinal evidence, in the form of shifts in rated
interest. Since researchers in the area of the effect of rewards on interest
have generally preterred unobtrusive measures of interest (e.g., behavioral
measures) as opposed to less obtrusive attitudinal measures for several rea
sons (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Pittman et al., 1982; Smith & Pittman, 1978), a
more sensitive and perhaps more central way to examine the attitude po
larization component of cued expectancy would be to assess the content of
current thought and its relationship to a bribe-versus-bonus orientation.
Since a bonus orientation may produce positive feelings, similarly positive
information in memory should be more accessible than other information
(lsen et al., 1978). Measuring anticipated interest in an activity by assess
ing recall of material in memory unrelated to the target activity could
therefore test attitude polarization unobtrusively and could also avoid po
tential problems associated with examining interest by attitudinal meas
ures. From a cued-expectancy perspective, then, reward provided in the
context of an interesting task description, generating a bonus orientation,
should make a good mood even better and should lead to increased recall
of positive affective material in comparison to no-reward, interesting task
control. In contrast, the feelings evoked by reward under circumstances
associated with a bribe orientation would not be assumed to generate posi
tive thoughts, but rather to facilitate the recall of emotionally negative ma
terial. This analysis would suggest that content of current thought should be
congruent with mood state determined by these different orientations.
These predictions for differential effects of mood on memory, de
pending on interpretation of the meaning of reward, are generally consis
tent with other theoretical orientations to an affective-cognitive interac
tion. For example, Bower's (1981) associative-network theory of emotion
and memory would predict that negative or positive emotion nodes are
primed by the bribe or bonus orientation and that activation from the
emotion nodes would spread to word nodes labeling the emotion and to
event nodes associated with the emotion. This spreading activation would
thereby prime emotion-associated material in memory, making it more
easily drawn upon than other information. Such a model for affective
cognitive interactions is supported by a growing and diverse body of
memory research (cf. Bower, 1981).
However, much of the data can be explained by invoking the effect of
cueing different categories on behavior (e.g., giving or not giving a gift),
rather than the effect of mood on memory (lsen, 1982). For example, it is
possible that the use of categories such as a gift versus no gift produced dif
ferential recall of events, independent of mood state. One means of testing
whether mood and not simply the cueing ot different categories accounts
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for behaviors such as recall of positive versus negative events is to use the
same category (e.g., a gift of money) to induce different mood states, de
pending on condition. By using the paradigm of attitude polarization, the
hypothesized effect of mood on memory would be supported if the effect
of the same reward on recall of positive and negative events resulted from
the feelings evoked by reward, depending on contextual conditions, and
not from the mere presence or absence of reward.
In the following experiment, the hypothesis that bribes and bonuses,
depending on interpretation of reward, affect the content of current
thought was assessed first by presenting a list of emotionally positive, neg
ative, and neutral words before the manipulation of interest in an alleged
forthcoming task (i.e., the target task), and then by requiring free recall of
this list after the task description. The target task was described to subjects
as either interesting or boring, or interest value was not described. In addi
tion, subjects were either promised reward or given no such promise for
performance in the forthcoming task. From the standpoint of a possible af
fective-cognitive interaction, the recall frequency of emotionally positive
and negative words was expected to vary according to conditions of inter
est value and reward, thereby demonstrating attitude polarization on the
one hand, and mood affects in memory on the other.

METHOD
SUBJECTS
A total of 92 students (43 males and 53 females) from Fordham University
were recruited on a volunteer basis to serve as subjects for an experiment
allegedly concerned with decision making. Subjects were run individually
by either a male or a female experimenter (both of whom were blind to the
hypotheses) and randomly assigned to one of six between-subjects condi
tions; two levels of reward (reward or no reward) were crossed with three
levels of manipulated interest value of the activity to be performed (high,
control, or low). The within-subjects factor of word type contained three
levels (positive, neutral, or negative).

MATERIALS
Words for the memory task were selected from Anderson's (1968) likable
ness ratings of personality-trait words. Eight positive words (e.g., ''kind,"
"friendly," "helpful") were chosen from words producing likableness
ratings of 475 or above; the eight negative words (e.g., "cold," "hostile,"
"greedy") were rated 175 or below. Fourteen neutral words ("careful,"
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"thrifty," "quiet") produced likableness ratings between 400 and 200; six
of the 14 neutral words were selected for the three beginning and the three
end positions on the list (fillers), and were more extreme within the range
of likable ratings. but were not scored at recall. All words received mean
ingfulness ratings of 350 or above. Finally, we chose words producing a
small ( < 1.00) variance in likableness ratings and counterbalanced word
length within word type.
Four different orders of the resulting list of 24 words were constructed
(with the constant filler words at beginning and end). Word type was
counterbalanced within blocks of six words, and consecutively occurring
words of the same type were not permitted. These lists were then taped
with a 2-second interval between words.

PROCEDURE
Subjects were told that they were participating in a study designed to test
purportedly the effect of performing different activities on the decision
making process. While one of a variety of activities was allegedly being
prepared, the subject was approached in the waiting room and asked to
help a graduate student with a short delayed-recall experiment. When the
subject agreed (all did), a taped list of adjectives was presented with in
structions to listen carefully.
During the retention interval of 5 minutes, more information alleged
ly concerning the decision-making task was provided. Subiects in the
high-interest-value condition (cf. Boggiano, 1981) were told that, of the
many different activities included in the study, they "fortunately" had
been assigned to do an exciting task. Those in the low-interest-value con
dition were told to expect an extremely tedious and monotonous activity.
No information concerning task interest value was offered to subjects as
signed to the control condition. Subjects selected to receive a reward were
then given $1.50 for participation. (Those in the no-reward condition were
paid the same amount during the debriefing.) Finally, before leaving the
waiting room to participate in the alleged decision-making task, the sub
ject was asked to engage in free recall of the list of words; guessing was en
couraged. All subjects were debriefed and dismissed following recall and
assessment of the manipulation of the interest value of the task.

RESULTS
RECALL
The first three rows of Table 1 present the mean number of positive, neu
tral, and negative words recalled by subjects in each condition of reward
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TABLE 1
Mean Number of Words of Each Type Recalled

INTEREST VALUE
INTERESTING

WORD TYPE

NEUTRAL

BORING

NO
NO
NO
REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD

Positive

3.43

2 .47

2 .50

2.00

2 .33

1.88

Neutral

1.57

1.87

2 .13

1 .94

2.73

1.38

Negative

1.71

2 .00

1.94

1.94

3.07

2 .13

1 .72

.47

-.74

-.25

Positive minus
negative words

.56

.06

and interest value. The data from the mixed design were submitted to an
analysis of variance, which revealed a reliable three-way interaction of
word type, reward, and interest value, F (4, 172)=2.48, MS�=.995. (The
significance level was set at .OS for all analyses.) This interaction corre
sponds directly with our central prediction that the combination of reward
and interest value produced a feeling (bonus or bribe) that, in turn, cued
recall of mood-related material. The interaction of task conditions differ
entially affected the type of words recalled. This three-way interaction is
seen more easily in the last row of Table 1, which describes the difference
between positive and negative word recall (omitting neutral words) for
each between-subjects condition. An analysis of the effect of reward and
three levels of interest value on positive words minus negative words re
vealed a marginally significant interaction, F (2, 91)=2.94, MS.=l.92,

.06; the interaction was reliable when the analysis included reward and
two levels of interest value (excluding the neutral condition), F (1, 59)=

p<

6.24, MS.=1.92. Thus, reward was found to have different effects on the
type of word recalled, depending on the interest value established for the
task.
Guided by predictions concerning the polarization effects of reward,
further analyses explored differences within each condition of interest
value, using all cells in the design. In the interesting-task condition, sub
jects differentially recalled positive, neutral, and negative words, depend
ing upon their expectation about reward, F (2, 172)=3.25, MS.=.995.
Furthermore, reward facilitated the recall of positive words only, F (1,
172)=4.99, MS.= .995. For the task condition in which interest value was
not manipulated (neutral), differences were not statistically reliable, as ex-
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pected. And, although differences in the boring-task condition were not as
large as those in the interesting-task condition, reward nevertheless in
creased the recall of negative words, F (1, 172)=4.67, MSe=.995. This dif
ference, however, must be viewed somewhat cautiously, given the lack of
a reliable interaction of word type with reward in the boring-task condi
tion and the obvious facilitation for recall of neutral words in that condi
tion. Yet, the reward effect on recall of negative words in the boring-task
condition is suggestive, especially when it is compared to the other two
task conditions, which show no increase on negative recall as a function of
reward. In this vein, the interaction of reward with interest value for recall
of negative wordswas reliable, F(2, 172)=3.14, MSe=.955. Thus, reward
increased both the recall of emotionally positive words when subjects
were expecting to participate in an interesting task, and the recall of emo
tionally negative words when subjects believed a boring task was allegedly
forthcoming.
In addition to the three-way interaction, other reliable effects were re
vealed by the overall analysis. First, the interest value of the task interact
ed with word type, F (4, 172)=5.71, MSe=.995; an inspection of the mean
suggests that subjects in the interesting task tended to recall more positive
words, whereas those in the boring task recalled more negative words.
Second, more positive words were recalled across all conditions, F (2,

172)=5.84, MSe=.995; and reward facilitated recall, F (1, 86)=5.91,
MSe=2.106.

INTEREST MANIPULATION
Table 2 presents the average rated interest in the forthcoming task for each
experimental condition. The interest value of the task, as described, did in
deed affect rated interest, F (2, 86)=24.30, MSe=18.325; and although the
reward factor did not reliably interact with interest value, the trend was in
the direction of differences in the memory task. Rated interest appeared to

TABLE2
Average Rated Interest in the Forthcoming Task
INTERES T VALUE
INTERESTING

NEUTRAL

BORING

Reward

16.50

14.56

8.13

No reward

15.00

14 .75

9 .13

REWARD COND ITION
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decrease for the boring task and increase for the interesting task when re
ward was offered. The strength of the effect of reward on expectancies
about task interest, in comparison to its effect on recall of positive or nega
tive word type, may be due to demand characteristics. In the interest-rat
ing task, subjects may have attempted to respond in a manner to verify the
experimenter's description of the activity more than to reflect their mood.
The strength of the main effect of interest value is consistent with this ex
planation.

DISCUSSION
Two reciprocal conclusions emerge from these results. Qualitative differ
ences in recall were established by nonreactive mood induction proce
dures, and the nature of the recall differences support the attitude polari
zation component of cued-expectancy theory. More specifically, subjects
who were "bribed" with a reward to perform an allegedly uninteresting
task recalled a larger number of negative words, presumably reflecting
their "bad mood," whereas those receiving a bonus reward to perform an
interesting task recalled a larger number of positive words, reflecting their
"good mood." Clearly, the results suggest an important link between the
attitude polarization effects of reward and the affective-cognitive interac
tion known as mood state. Furthermore, unlike a number of previous find
ings (e.g., Bower, 1981), the data are not easily interpreted by means of a
demand explanation.
From the standpoint of cued-expectancy theory, it is interesting to
note that while differences in memory for affective material support the at
titude polarization component, ratings of task interest did not. These dif
ferences in behavioral versus attitudinal measures parallel findings in the
overjustification literature (Pittman et al., 1982; Smith & Pittman, 1978).
As suggested by a number of researchers (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977;
Smith & Pittman, 1978), subjects may not have access to the processes that
mediate their behavior. Thus, feelings about the activity to be performed
may have been polarized without subjects being aware of their feelings.
Alternatively, a demand explanation may account for subjects' responses
in the interest-rating task.
With regard to differences in memory for affective material, it would
appear unlikely that subjects deliberated carefully about the effect reward
had on their mood when retrieving information from memory. According
to theoretical analyses of the effect of mood state on behavior (Clark &
Isen,

1982), mood is assumed to influence judgment much of the time with-
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out conscious awareness. Such "automatic processing" effects may occur
in a nonreflective manner and may affect our impressions of both people
and objects (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1980; Zajonc, 1980). From
this perspective, even thinking about favorable or unfavorable events
may polarize attitudes about those events (e.g., Tesser, 1978), since
thoughts congruent with affect associated with those events would come
to mind and intensify initial attitude about the events. Thus, a feeling state
may automatically activate affect-congruent thoughts about an event,
which may both intensify initial feelings about that event and increase the
likelihood that one will behave in a manner consistent with that feeling
state. This line of reasoning suggests the process by which mood state may
be maintained.
Although automatic processing may account for the effect of positive
mood state on behavior, it does not appear consistent with the body of re
search examining the effect of negative feelings on judgments and behav
ior. That is, while a positive feeling state has generally been found to in
crease the probability of drawing upon positive material in memory and
behaviors such as helping and generosity (Aderman, 1972; Batson, Coke,
Chard, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980;
Isen, 1970; !sen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976; !sen & Levin, 1972; Levin & !sen,

1975; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1973; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan,
1973; Underwood, Froming, & Moore, 1977; Weyant, 1978), the effects of
negative feeling states are far more complex. Some studies suggest that in
ducing negative mood states increases the likelihood of antisocial behaviors
(Baron, 1972; Baron & Bell, 1975), whereas others suggest that negative
affect either has no effect or increases the likelihood of positive behaviors
(Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini &
Kenrick, 1976; !sen, 1970; McMillen, 1971; Mischel, Coates, & Raskoff,

1968; Mischel & Moore, 1973; D. T. Reagan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972;
J. W. Regan, 1971; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Underwood, Moore, &
Rosenhan, 1973).
The data on the effect of negative feeling states on behavior have been
interpreted as suggesting that, unlike positive feeling states, in which
mood is often automatically maintained, negative feeling states may well
motivate people to control or change their mood state (Clark & !sen,

1982). In this sense, people exposed to negative mood induction may at
tempt to alter their mood state by thinking or behaving in a positive way.
Although this analysis is consistent with the findings of much research, it
does not explain why negative mood will increase the likelihood of antiso
cial behaviors or make negative material from memory more accessible, as
shown to some extent in the present study.
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Although highly speculative, the following hypothesis is offered to
account for the differential effects of negative mood states on judgments
and behavior. The majority of studies manipulating negative mood state
would appear to have produced shame, sadness, or depression. For exam
ple, failure in a task would presumably induce feelings of shame or sadness
(Isen et al., 1978). Other researchers have explicitly told subjects to think
about sad events (e.g., Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Underwood et al., 1973)
or have prompted subjects to commit some transgression (e.g., Cialdini et

al., 1973). The results of this body of research indicate that subjects be
haved in a positive way (e.g., helping), presumably to alleviate the shame
or to compensate for failure.
In contrast, negative mood states involving anger rather than sadness
may produce somewhat different effects. Like individuals who feel sad or
ashamed, those who feel angry may also be motivated to change their
mood state. However, the strategy employed for this purpose may involve
some form of catharsis; subjects may attempt to redirect angry feelings.
Specifically, individuals who feel angry may think about other negative
events or perform negative behaviors to release their angry feelings, at
least for a brief time following the anger-inducing event (e.g., Baron,

1972; Baron & Bell, 1975). Alternatively, anger may be located concep
tually on a continuum of controlled to automatic maintenance, some
where between positive feelings and sadness. Anger may be more automa
tically maintained than feelings of sadness, especially for those who have
not learned to control their angry feelings. Finally, anger may simply pro
duce stronger negative feelings than sadness or shame, making it much
more difficult to behave or think positively.
Thus, one perspective on the effects of negative mood state on the re
call results of this study is to view the bribe condition as producing feelings
better described as anger than as sadness. Subjects temporarily maintained
their angry feelings, either automatically or purposefully (to release
them). Consequently, their negative quality influenced the content of
thought, including retrieval of negative words. This interpretation may be
contrasted with predictions regarding sad mood states evoked by manipu
lations that are not bribe-oriented. Implications of these findings about the
effect of negative mood states should be considered on a cautionary note,
of course, since our findings about negative feelings were substantially
smaller than the findings regarding the effect of positive mood state on
memory. However, this perspective does contribute testable implications
for individual differences in mood effects on memory, determined perhaps
by the degree of anger or sadness that individuals feel in a common situ
ation.
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